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UNDERSTANDING THE INDUSTRIAL
REVOLUTION1
British Economic Growth during the Industrial Revolution. By N. F. R. Crafts. Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1985. Pp. 193. £19.50 (paperback £7.95).
The Economics of the Industrial Revolution. Edited by Joel Mokyr. London: George Allen
and Unwin, 1985. Pp. xi+267. £18.50 (paperback £7.95).
The History of the British Coal Industry. Volume 2: ijoo-1830: The Industrial Revolution.
By Michael W. Flinn. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984. Pp. xxi + 491. £35.
The First Industrialists: the Problem of Origins. By Francois Crouzet. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1985. Pp. ix+229. £22.50.
Manufacture in Town and Country before the Factory. Edited by Maxine Berg, Pat Hudson
and Michael Sonenscher. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983. Pp. ix + 213.
£25-
The Age of Manufactures. By Maxine Berg. London: Fontana, 1985. Pp. 378. £4.95.
Since Toynbee in 1884, historian after historian has struggled to unravel the Gordian
knot of the British Industrial Revolution. Some have tried to unpick it, others to cut
through it. But if the knot has been loosened here or there it remains largely secure.
Synoptic views of the Industrial Revolution have rarely had a long life. As details of
the economy have increased it has proved difficult to link them together in an
explanatory framework. To undergraduates, the Industrial Revolution remains easiest
to consider as a series of only loosely related problems such as demand, technical change,
capital formation and business enterprise. To them, understanding the Industrial
Revolution is not a challenge but a headache.
Not the least of the problems has been one of definition: what was the Industrial
Revolution? To Cameron the term 'has no scientific standing' and Professor Davis has
complained that ' Nowhere... is the term defined in an operational manner' and ' Since
the term is undefined, it can be caused by anything'.2 Such disquiet is far from novel.
In 1333 Herbert Heaton noted that 'As alabel i^is^admittedly unsatisfactory'. Others
felt the same." Historians have used the term very freely, causing much confusion in
the process. It has been used so often, and in such different ways, that it has come to
mean all things to all men. It has become an assumption rather than a reasonably
precise term. Donald Coleman described three ways historians have used it: industrial
revolutions of particular industries, of particular sectors or of national economies.4 And
1
 Many thanks to Joanna Innes for her comments on a draft of this review.
* R. Cameron,'Theindustrialrevolution,amisnomer',inJ. Schneider(ed.), Wirtschaftkrafteund
Wtrstschafiswege, v (Stuttgart, 1981), 367. L. E. Davis, 'Specification, quantification and analysis
in economic history', in G. R. TaylorandL. F. Ellsworth (eds.), Approaches to American economic history
(Charlottesville, Virginia, 1971), p. 109.
* 'The industrial revolution', reprinted in R. M. Hartwell (ed.), The causes of the industrial
revolution in England (London, 1967), p. 31.
* D. C. Coleman, 'Industrial growth and industrial revolutions', Economica, xxni (1956), 2.
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if some historians tend to 'isolate its essential economic characteristics' jithers take a
broader view, stressing that it involved the transformation of society, politics and ideas
as well as the economy.6 But by and laTge, the Industrial RevoTutiblTriasTjecorne a
plaything of economic historians. They more than anyone have been responsible for
what insights and misunderstandings we have. But, as David Cannadine pointed out
recently, specifically economic histories of the Industrial Revolution have often been
fickle and fashion-conscious.6 Technical change, structural realignment and macro-
economic performance, the principal foci of the economic historians, have been
approached by different routes and with different aims.' Most often, they have been
viewed not in their own terms but in relation to the framework of economic growth.
This whiggishness is also evident in the importance of teleology to the economic history
of the period. The appropriation of the Industrial Revolution by economic historians
is a problem because of these particularities, but is also awkward because it reinforces
the tendency to exaggerate the force of economic determinism - particularly in terms
of the social, intellectual and political history of the period.
A lack of understanding has arisen from more than just this multiplicity of
perspectives, concerns and definitions. Crucially, it has also centred on the descriptive
outlines and chronological boundaries assigned to the Industrial Revolution. Historians
still find it difficult to describe, not just because of the flow of new evidence but also
because of continuing uncertainly with the implications of the word 'revolution'.
Generally, historians have located the British Industrial Revolution in the century
f75<5:1-785O, most commonly in the years 1760-1830. But most agree that the rate of
change was revolutionary in only a few areas of the economy and that, more generally,
change was gradual by the standards of political revolutions. More than that however,
uncertainty*with the industrial' revolution' has been created by differences in weight put
on the study of either causes, courses or consequences by historians. Economic historians
have tended to concentrate on the first and second, social historians on the second and
third. Related to this is the conflict between the old view, - that the Industrial
Revolution encapsulated change, - and the view that has developed since c. 1920 that
it was an acceleration of change and therefore also involved elements of continuity.
Despite all these differences some common ground does exist which, in the ligfit of
the problems just raised, offers a way forward with the term. Historians, as Crafts shows,
will continue to use the term, and the problem therefore is to construct a meaningful
definition.8 All historians agree that it was a 'great discontinuity', the transition from
one kind of society and economy to another ^"primarily the transition from agricultural
to industrial primacy." It is widely recognized now that within Britain in the period
1750-1850 this transition was neither begun nor finished. Consequently, using the
concept of the Tndustrial Revolution must involve the use of complementary, over-
6
 R. M. Hartwell, 'Introduction', in Hartwell, Causes of the industrial revolution, p.7. Also G. N.
Clark, The idea of the industrial revolution (Glasgow, 1953), p.33. T. S. Ashton, The industrial revolution
1760-1830 (Oxford, 1977), pp. 1-2.
* ' The present and the past in the English industrial revolution 1880-1980', Past and Present, on
(1984). i3i- '72-
7
 Mokyr, 'The industrial revolution', in Mokyr, pp. 3-4. Crafts, pp. 6-7.
8
 Crafts, p. 6.
* A. Thompson, The dynamics of the industrial revolution (London, 1973), p. 29. R- M. Hartwell,
' The great discontinuity', in his The industrial revolution and economic growth (London, 1971), pp.44-51.
C. M. Cipolla, The economic history of world population (Harmondsworth, 1972), pp. 26-32.
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Japping chronologies. The medium term concerns the period 1750-1850, where, for
example, population grew rapidly and people moved swiftly from hamlets and villages
to towns and cities. Under this notation the .medium-term view might, as Coleman
suggested, be called the' classic' Industrial Revolution.10 The long term involves gradual
economic evolution, socTal developments and other changes (and continuities) from the
late sixteenth century, particularly in relation to agricultural development, overseas
tra3e, the emergence of more consumer-orientated industries and market awareness.
But the long-term Industrial Revolution will have to stretch beyond 1750, beyond 1850
in fact, to the 'conclusion' of the transition in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries. In this schema, the short term would involve brief moments of transition,
like periods of parliamentary enclosure, the mechanization of various industries, the
spread of _turnpikes an5 the like. Altogether, by utilizing these various chronologies of
transition, by recognizing that transition involved continuity and change and by
admitting that transition was more than economic and not always economically
determined, justice can be done to the complexity of the Industrial Revolution and a
framework for its comprehension erected. But unless such a complex approach is
adopted misunderstanding is likely to continue.
One of the latest assaults on the Gordian knot goes under the guise of the new
economic history. The proponents of this approach come to study past economies from
economics rather than history and 'The methodological hallmarks... are its emphasis
on measurement and its recognition of the intimate relationship between measurement
and theory.>n Launched in the 1950s in the U.S.A., and first directed to problems in
"American economic history, the new economic history reached these shores in force in
the early 1970s. It made a dramatic impact in the debate over the performance of the
British economy and its businessmen between 1870 and 1914.12 Since then it has sailed
back in time to help in the study of the process of industrialization in Britain. Mokyr's
volume collects some of the products of this venture, and Crafts provides' a presentation
of recent research on the overall growth of the British economy during industrialization',
which draws heavily on both his own and others' new economic history.13
It is difficult to extract a consensus view of the new economic history of the British
Industrial Revolution from Mokyr's volume; the articles are similar more in method
than in findings or concerns. But the message ofCrafts's excellent book could not be
clearer. He produces a quantitative outline of the British economy between 1700 and
1831 and fruitfully pushes the study of the transitions beyond 1850. His central
conclusion is that the British economy, far from experiencing some Rostovian ' take-ofT
in the late eighteenth century, grew modestly and slowly in the aggregate before the
railway age.14 ' In particular, it seems clear that the economy did not reach 3 per cent
per year growth in real output before 1830.'15 Mental images of the economy during
10
 ' Industrial growth and industrial revolutions.'
11
 R. W. Fogel, 'The new economic history', Economic History Review, xxtx (1966), 651. New
economic history has also been called Cliometric or econometric history. ' A cliometrician is an
economist applying economic theory (usually simple) to historical facts (not always quantitative)
in the interest of history (not economics)'. D. N. McGloskey, 'The achievements of the Cliometric
school', Journal of Economic History, xxxvm (1978), 15.
l s
 See, for example, D. N. McCloskey and L. G. Sand berg, ' From damnation to redemption:
judgments on the late Victorian entrepreneur', Explorations in Economic History, ix (1971), 89-108.
13
 Crafts, p. 1.
14
 W. W. Rostow, The stages of economic growth. A non-communist manifesto (Cambridge, i960).
16
 Crafts, p. 47.
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the classic Industrial Revolution as a period of rapid growth, factory production and i
steam-driven machinery are shown toTje*appropriate tojust one or two unrepresentative
Sectors like cotton and iron. This conclusion assaults ideas both of' take-ofF and of ~ \
' leading sectors'. But its central attack is directed against the innovating work of Deane
and Cole who, in 1959, produced the first major quantitative outline of the British i
economy during the Industrial Revolution.16 Crafts's work is formulated explicitly in
terms of revising Deane and Cole. This is done by utilizing new data that have appeared
in the last twenty years and by questioning the assumptions and methods that underlay
their work.
Crafts suggests several clear reasons for the lack of marked discontinuity in the overall,
quantitative performance of the economy~BetweeiTT7DOiin9"i830. First, productivity
growth in agriculture was better before 1760 than after. The diffusion of new crops,
rotations ari3~prtvaj£e enclosure before the middle of the eighteenth century were
concentrated on better, less marginal soils. Changes after 1760, like the spread of new
breeds, the Rotherham plough or parliamentary enclosure, were not only less significant
in themselves when compared to the new crops and rotations but often affected more
marginal land. Agriculture was a diminishing returns industry between roughly 1760
and the era of high farming iiT'the mid-nineteenth century.17 Secondly, rapid
revolutionary industrial growth was achieved only in the cotton and iron industries.
Traditional industries, such as wool, brewing, leather working, soap and candle
production, experienced slow and sure change. And such industries accounted for the
major share of tot|Uindustrial activity. Thirdly, trade and transport, broadly defined,
grew slowly. The impact of improved river navigation, coastal trade, canals and
turnpikes, not to mention marketing facilities, was gradual rather than dramatic.
Finally, Crafts draws his conclusion about slow growth during the Industrial Revolution
both by using new data and by arguing that previous estimates, like those of Deane
and Cole, rested on procedures which 'are seriously flawed and exaggerate growth'.18
Principally this relates to the price deflators others used and to their assumptions about
and calculations of sectoral shares of total economic activity. For example, Lindert and
Williamson's reworking of Gregory King's estimates of the size and structure of English
society and incomes at the end of the seventeenth century has shown that King
overestimated the importance of agriculture and underestimated the importance of
industry at the time. Deane and Cole relied on King's estimates, Crafts relies on Lindert
and Williamson's revisions.19
The picture Crafts paints of the British economy between 1700 and 1830 is one where
important but undramatic changes took place before as well as after 1760. It accepts
that the transition began before 1750 and finished after 1850, though his long-term
perspective does not go back before 1700. In particular, he draws attention to the early
and substantial dwindling of agricultural employment and the movement of labour into
relatively low-productivity sectors. Labour _went more from the fields to outwork or
workshops than to factories. In Crafts's words, before 1830 the economy was not
'pervasively innovative... and the period of rapid productivity growth was a relatively
14
 P. Deane and W. A. Cole, British economic growth 1688-1959 (2nd ^^ Cambridge, 1969).
17
 See R. V.Jackson, 'Growth and deceleration in English agriculture, 1660-1790', Economic
History Review, XXXVIII (1985), 333-51.
18
 Crafts, p. 30.
'• P. H. Lindert and J.G.Williamson, 'Revising England's social tables, 1688-1812',
Explorations in Economic History, xix (1982), 385-408.
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brief mid-nineteenth-century phenomenon'.20 Such a picture might be thought to be
novel more in terms of its quantitative detail and substance than its outline. As David
Cannadine has pointed out, Clapham argued in the 1920s that the British Industrial
Revolution was far from romprehensive or general. In Cannadine's words, Clapham
'showed how gradual an9 localized the Industrial Revolution was...[and] examined
in great detail the predominant and non-mechanized industries, and noted how little
change there had been by 1851 '.81 In this light, Rostow led economic historians up a
blind alley and Deane and Cole led them up a wrong road. It is a salutary lesson that
they took us away from as well as towards an accurate portrayal of the Industrial
Revolution.
In fact, Crafts has gone beyond the characterization offered by Clapham, mainly
by concentrating on the nature of the profound structural transformation that was
experienced by the economy. In his terms, if inj25S some 55 per cent of the wojkforcp.
was in agriculture but in 1850 only 22 per cent, and if in 1750 around 21 per cent of
the population lived in towns but in 1850 around 54 per cent, then such changes can
j^ffirtly be called an Industr[alRe»folutioa.82 For Crafts, following Mathias, the Industrial
Revolution can be defined as the 'fundamental redeployment of resources... by the
1840s \2 3 For him, that is what the classic Industrial Revolution involved. He also shows
that_sjjbstantig^stfH£tl}raljCha.nge in the balance of the economy was not matched by
high growth rates, not least because' the economy found it hard to maintain the growth
"of capital at a rate in excess of the labour force during the period 1760-1830'.24
Productivity advance was held back by the dominance of relatively labour-intensive
work. Crafts rightly puts considerable stress on the estimate that British agriculture
released labour at an early stage of the process of industrialization. In fact, because
agriculture was so efficient food imports were minimized, balance of payments problems
avoided and the structural dominance of export industries like cotton not encouraged.
'Britain's structural transformation was heavily orientated towards the establishment
of a high share of the labour for.ce.in manufacturing rather than high output per worker
within industry '.2S The highly productive export industries have to be set alongside other
large industries, such as brewing and baking, which hardly exported any of their output
at all.
To Crafts, the Industrial Revolution had as much to do with the balance of the
economy as the novelty of productive techniques. Secondly, change ' had proceeded
further than Gregory King perceived by the beginning of the eighteenth century...
[and] the structural changes were accomplished at a stage when income per head had
still not risen very much'.26 He contests Wrigley's point that the central characteristic
of the Industrial Revolution was 'the rise in real income per head'.27 The economy
struggled to cope with rapid population growth and as a result quantitative living
standards failed to improve significantly before the 1820s. The 'radical break' in the
" Crafts, p. 87.
11
 'The present and the past', p. 139. J. H. Clapham, An economic history of modem Britain, 3 vols.
(Cambridge, 1926-38).
*
s
 Crafts, pp. 4,65-9. E. A. Wrigley, 'Urban growth and agricultural change: England and the
continent in the early modern period', Journal of Interdisciplinary History, xv (1985), 700. Deane and
Cole, British economic growth, p. 142. P. J. Waller, Town, city and nation: England 1850-1914 (Oxford,
1983), P- 7-
** Crafts, p. 69. P. Mathias, The first industrial nation (London, 1969), p. 2.
" Crafts, p. 76. 28 Crafts, p. 152. » Crafts, p. 7.
17
 E. A. Wrigley, 'The process of modernization and the Industrial Revolution in England',
Journal of Interdisciplinary History, m (1972), 227.
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early nineteenth century discerned by Wrigley and Schofield, when population and real
wages began to rise together in a sustained fashion for the first time, came in the midst
of significant structural change and was only consolidated and made permanent by the
rapid productivity advance experienced during_the railwav age (c. 1830-70) .f*
rf"is"~noTjust the information and ideas that make Crafts*s*"BooIfso valuable and
compelling, but also his modesty, common sense and self-criticism. There are no
exaggerated claims because evidence and method are always presented in a way that
allows the reader to contest the point. Despite the occasional algebraic formulation,
moreover, the book is literary rather than mathematical, though it is a study that is
constantly supported and encouraged by economic theory. It is likely to remain the
most important contribution of new economic history to the study of the Industrial
Revolution for some years.
According to Mokyr, the new economic history 'has used existing statistics in new
and imaginative ways and has added significantly to the body of quantitative
information concerning England during the Industrial Revolution. But most important,
the New Economic History has imposed certain standards of economic logic upon the
field'.2* It is precisely the statistical basis and economic logic behind this approach that
define its strengths and weaknesses. In the first place, large areas of economic activity
for this period have left no direct spurce
~~W5T$ble example. Consequently, quantifiers are driven on to indirect means, where
assumptions and informed guessfer~aTe™employed and unknown margins of error
introduced.'As Flinn remarks in his clear and thorough history, the sources available
to calculate coal output during the period 1700-1830 'can offer no more than guides to
the growth of some sections of the trades in coal'.30 So whereas Crafts has the annual
compounded growth rate of coal output between 1700 and 1760 as 0-64 per^cef^JTiDn
. •prrtS~the'fignre*arT-T3 between 1700 and 1750 - nearly twice as quick. And Pollard's
estimates of coal output, whose figures Crafts relied on, fall short of Flinn's by between
14 and 24 percent between 1750 and 1815." Crafts, more than most quantifiers, is
fully conscious of the shifting statistical sands his enterprise rests on. One can either
accept the assumptions he uses to piece together bits of statistics about the economy
or one can replace them. In the end, many will accept or reject them on impressionistic
grounds - that the figures he comes up with either do or do not make sense in terms
of all the other bits of information we have about the economy. Quantifying the
eighteenth-century economy often involves much the same sort of guesses employed by
those who use impressionistic evidence as representative of broader trendsjJ3r,afts, it
seems to me, has made good guesses, though in time better ones may be made,,,.
Applying the new economic history to the study of the Industrial Revolution is
constrained both by data and by the suitability of the 'standards of economic logic'
that Mokyr referred to as the discipline's most important contribution. Those standards
88
 E. A. Wrigley and R. S. Schofield, The population history of England 1541-1871. A reconstruction
(London, 1981), p. 440.
*• Mokyr, 'The industrial revolution', in Mokyr, p. 2.
30
 Flinn, p. 25; my emphasis. On the problems of quantifying aspects of agrarian change see
M. Overton,' Agricultural productivity in eighteenth-century England :somefurtherspeculations',
Economic History Review, xxxvn (1984), 244-51 and M. Turner, 'Agricultural productivity in
eighteenth-century England: further strains of speculation', Economic History Review, xxxvn (1984),
252-7.
31
 Crafts, p. 23. Flinn, p. 26. S. Pollard, 'A new estimate of British coal production, 1750-1850',
Economic History Review, xxxm (1980), 212-35.
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are good because they are explicit but poor because they may reflect poorly the actual
logic of the eighteenth-century economy. Most of the new economic history of Britain
in this period tends to treat the economy as a homogeneous entity. Yet when historians,
new or old, talk about the national economy in this period they do so out of convenience
as much as a reflexion of historical reality. Statistics about the national economy are
an average and, like all averages, it is helpful to know about dispersion around the
mean. OntyTTifew~elemehts~6T economic life in the eighteenth and early nineteenth
"centuries operated in national terms - largely those influenced by political factors such
as customs, excise, legislation or war, though overseas trade and the balance of
payments can also be viewed nationally. Pollard has rightly stressed that^The
industrialization of Europe did not proceed country by country'; it was regional, where
Bounctaries* Teff insfde""and sometimes crossed national borders.32 To describe and
analyse the Industrial Revolution we often have to look at structural change and
productivity growth on a regional basis and where attention is directed at both positive
and negative developments. In fact Crafts is at some pains to acknowledge regional
diversity, but usually adopts a national perspective.
Economically, the Industrial Revolution was the sum of prosperity and growth in
regions like the Lancashire cotton industry and^the West Ri3ing~wbollen trades, of
failure and regfess'Tn'feglons like the Norfolk cloth industry and the Wealden iron
industry and of relative stability in areas like London. It was the sum of significant
agricultural advance in areas well suited to the new crops and rotations and of the
struggle fo^profuability jn , those areas less well suited. Because overall the economy
pfospeTecfrifEas been too easy to forget about those areas which did not, and too easy
to view the eighteenth-century economy mainly as a place in which to uncover the
origins of the Industrial Revolution. To adopt only a national, macro view of the
economy carries with it the danger of drifting into whig history and, in all likelihood,
teleology. Of course, this forward-looking perspective is far from limited to the new
economic history. Crouzet's study, very much a traditional piece of economic history,
looks at the social and occupational origins of industrialists as 'a new type of
businessman, which emerged during the Industrial Revolution'. By picking out the
industrialists Crouzet implicitly adopts the attitude that they were the key to the future
in terms of business enterprise. But any piece of economic history which isolates dynamic
and progressive features within an economy is likely to caricature as well as characterize
it.
If one consequence of studying the economy in national terms is a certain whiggish-
ness, another problem arises from the belief that we can talk about economic forces
operating in national ways. Most new economic historians adopt a partial or general
equilibrium analysis in their approach, where markets work to Tiring supply and
^gSrnaiid into balance across the nation at a certain price. Essentially this relates to the
belief that markets were well formed and reasonably competitive. Crafts argues that
' the national economy of Britain represented, for many products, a well-integrated
national goods market by the early nineteenth century and a fairly well-integrated set
of factor markets with much more internal mobility of capital and labour than there
was in the international economy \3 3 Yet, as Habakkuk wrote,' historians spend all their
time dealing with economies which are not in equilibrium'.34 Crafts's point can be
31
 S. Pollard,' Industrialization and the European economy', in Mokyr, p. 166. Also, Wrigley,
'Process of modernization', p. 252 n. 57.
M
 Crafts, p. 3.
34
 H. J. Habakkuk, 'Economic history and economic theory', Daedalus, c (1971), 313.
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contested in fact, as he himself does later.35 For example, if the English market for wheat
was efficient and well integrated by 1750 this was not true of other grains.3' To take
a second example, the poor laws were reformed in 1834 in part at least because labour
was_seen as immobile, causing' labour nfffrtats^ttriMr-THrtr-'constanT'state of
disequ3ibTrimn.MAs a final example, it is possible that the extensive use of highly
unstable credit by businessmen during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries testifies to a similar problem in capital markets.38 Why does this matter?
Taking labour as an example, if labour markets were imperfect and not in equilibrium
then participation rates almost certainly varied from place to place, to the extent
that one cannot, as Crafts does, use population data as the basis of seeking the role of
labour productivity in growth. Moreover, market inefficiencies were unlikely to have
been constant over time, though new economic historians often assume they were. At
least part of the task before economic historians of the Industrial Revolution,
therefore, is to try to see if and how the quality of markets changed during this period. \
So far, new economic historians have only looked at the markets for wheat and ]
securities; old economic historians have done little more.3' Studying markets also r
has the salutary influence of weaning historians away from their preoccupation with
production towards distribution.
As Crafts says, the growth-accounting framework he uses is a ' simple' way of looking
at the sources of growth.40 But it may be too simple, though it is not , as McCloskey
rightly points out, different in kind from the ways old economic historians pursue their
task: ' One must leap over gaps in the data. The leaps are necessary, but each student
of the subject makes them in a personal style: the statistical and literary approaches
to history are not so very far apart'.41 But some leaps have to be made, others are by
choice. So far both new and old economic historians have been reluctant to tackle the
problem of the nature of markets in this period. They are leaping because they have
not looked for alternative routes.
Peter Temin has argued that ' Economists assume almost automatically that people
engaged in market behaviour act instrumentally or rationally. Other social scientists
almost automatically assume that they do not'.42 Allied to this, one persistent early
36
 Crafts, p. 68.
36
 J. A. Chartres,' The marketing of agricultural produce', in J . Thirsk (ed.), The agrarian history
ofEngland andWalts, v, 2 (Cambridge, 1985), 459-65. C. W. J. Granger and C. M. Elliott,'Afresh
look at wheat prices and markets in the eighteenth century', Economic History Review, xx (1967),
257-65-
" K. D. M. Snell, Annals of the labouring poor (Cambridge, 1985).
" J . Hoppit, "The use and abuse of credit in eighteenth-century England', in R. B. Outhwaite
and N. McKendrick (eds.), Business life and public policy (Cambridge, 1986), pp. 64—78.
P. Mathias, 'Capital credit and enterprise in the industrial revolution', in his The transformation
of England (London, 1979), pp. 91-2.
" Granger and Elliott, 'A fresh look at wheat prices'. R. V. Eagly and V. K. Smith, 'Domestic
and international integration of the London money market, 1731-1789', Journal of Economic History,
xxxvi (1976), 198-212. B. T. Parsons, 'The behaviour of prices on the London stock market in
the early eighteenth century' (University of Chicago Ph.D. thesis, 1974). Chartres,' The marketing
of agricultural p roduce ' . E. Pawson, Transport and economy: the turnpike roads of eighteenth century Britain
(London, 1977). G. L. Turnbull,' Provincial road carrying in England in the eighteenth century',
Journal of Transport History, iv (1977), 17—39.
" Crafts, p. 79.
41
 D. N. McCloskey, 'The industrial revolution 1780-1860: a survey', in Mokyr, p. 62.
41
 'The future of the new economic history', in T. K. Rabb and R. I. Rotberg (eds.), The new
history (Princeton, 1982), p. 188.
REVIEW ARTICLES 219
complaint about the new economic history was that it was too dependent on unrefined
neoclassical economics. This type of economics has been assaulted by economists on
theoretical and practical grounds, and by historians who doubt its applicability to the
reality of the past.
The power of neoclassical theory derives from the strong assumptions it makes about the presence
of competition, the absence of transactions cost and uncertainty, and the stability of underlying
economic institutions. Many of the most interesting historical problems in economics, however,
revolve around the absence or imperfections of competition, the consequences of substantial
transactions cost and uncertainty, and changes in the economic institutions of society.48
These criticisms have had an effect, leading to new theoretical developments and wider
concerns that ' have explored the implication of decision-making under uncertainty, the
value of time, the cost of information, and positive transaction costs'.44 But if new
economic history has begun to lengthen its agenda in these ways this process is still
unfinished and has had little direct impact on British economic history. The most
vigorous proponent of what might inelegantly be called the new-new economic history,
Professor North, has concentrated largely on the very broadest of generalizations about
economic change in the past.45 British economic history has not been touched
significantly by this trend of inquiry, at least not by new economic historians. But other
historians have assaulted the precepts of pure neoclassical economic history by coming
at the Industrial Revolution from the direction of social as well as economic history.
This is the perspective adopted in the volume of essays edited by Berg, Hudson and
Sonenscher and in Berg's own book.
Berg, Hudson and Sonenscher argue that
'Pre-industriaT social values and practices seem everywhere to have profoundly affected the
emergence and extent of factory manufacture and the displacement of rural domestic production.
The transition to the factory was not just an economic question concerning the relative merits
or efficiency of one form of organisation and technology over another, but a social and political
issue.4"
The importance of such factors is determined not only by the inadequacy of pure
neoclassicism - of which Crafts is perfectly well aware - but precisely by Crafts's
arguments that the economy in 1700 was better developed than had been thought, only
changed gradually thereafter and retained many of its old features and methods down
to 1850. Whereas Crafts's book acknowledges the importance of transitions before 1750,
it mostly stretches the chronology of the Industrial Revolution in the direction of the
mid and late nineteenth century. But Berg, Hudson and Sonenscher stretch it mostly
in the direction of the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. Attention has shifted,
at leasTamoTIgTHHTess persistently quantitative economic historians, from looking at
what happened after 1760 to looking at what happened in the century before then. Most
commonly, this discussion has been phrased in terms of the concept of proto-
industrialization - a way of describing rural industry in the pre-industrial era and a
""way ot explaining the presence and^BtelicTtii^nte'D'etweeirsuHR" rural industries and
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rhnrrin of the classic Industrial Revolution.47 The ghost of
proto-industrialization occasionally shows itself in the pages of both The age of
manufactures and Manufacture in town and country, though Berg's own book is less successful
at shrugging off the limitations of the model than the edited volume. It is rightly pointed
out that there is 'great difficulty of generalising about these complex changes' by which
some areas of pre-industrial industry were followed by industrialization while others
were not.48 They notice that 'most of the proto-industry literature still tends to view
the complexity of economic, social and familial relationships in the past in terms of their
transitional qualities rather than in terms of thejrown internal characteristics'.49
As might be expected the due caution expressed by Berg, Hudson and Sonenscher
derives from their reading of highly detailed, often local, studies. Hudson's own chapter
in the volume, 'From manor to mill: the West Riding in transition', investigates two
broad types of rural domestic industry - the artisanal and the putting out - and shows
that it was far from inevitable that the supposedly more modern and efficient of the
two, putting out, would dominate the shift to factory production in woollens. The
artisanal system, far from dying an agonizing death, survived in a new state because
of the strength of'aspects of co-operation, custom and community which were in part
the legacy of the older agrarian order '.60 Where the manorial system had crumbled least,
where enclosure had not advanced too far, where size of holdings remained viable for
individual proprietorship, or where leasehold and copyhold were still intact, the
smallholder who was also an artisanal producer had the prestige and collateral to link
into the chains of credit which were so vital to continuecVprosperity'and competitiveness.
In this case, economy and society happily united the old and the new.
Styles's chapter contests Professor North's belief that by 1700 England' had developed
an efficient set of property rights embedded in the common law... The stage was now
set for the industrial revolution'.51 According to North, these
better specified property rights... improved factor and product markets... [and] The resultant
increasing market size induced greater specialization and division of labor, which increased
transaction cost. Organizational changes were devised to reduce these transaction costs and Had
the consequence of radically lowering the cost of innovating at the same time that the increasing
market size and better specified property rights over inventions were raising.the rate of return
on innovating.58
Yet as Styles points out in his excellent essay on embezzlement in industry between
1500 and 1800, it is by no means clear that property rights in the specific case of the
appropriation by the workforce of goods in the process of manufacture, such as wood,
rope or canvas, were clearly denned, even by 1800.53 Although parliament did pass
47
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statutes against embezzlement through the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, these
laws were initiated by local and particular concerns rather than some sense of
'modernising' capitalistic relations. Moreover, prosecution against embezzling varied
not just from place to place through the eighteenth century, but over time within specific
localities. And even a modern area of the economy like the Yorkshire worsted industry
was campaigning against their weavers on this score as late as 1837 and possibly beyond.
In the instance of embezzlement, therefore, the redefinition of property rights was a
long and tortuous process that began well before 1700 and continued well after the start
of industrialization. Here, once again, the market was mediated and influenced by social
expectations that were only partly considered in monetary terms; embezzlement was
also seen as a right.
Manufacture in town and country does not try to provide some overview of the British
economy in the eighteenth century. It is a collection of disparate essays, covering parts
? of England, France and Germany, held together by a thought-provoking but slightly
awkwardly structured introduction. Berg's own book promises a more satisfactory
structure and synoptic view, but on both counts is disappointing. It is a textbook, in
so much as it is a synthesis of other historians' research, that perceptively and
ambitiously aims to link economic history to social and intellectual history, anthro-
pology, sociology and theory. But for all its many good intentions and insights, the book
is lifeless. It lacks exactly the virtues of vigour, penetration and cohesion of Berg's book
on the ' machinery question' in the early ninteenth century.54 The faults of the book are
more those of presentation than argument, though that might be enough to seal its fate
as a textbook.
Berg begins The age of manufactures with a series of justified complaints about current
economic histories of the Industrial Revolution. Under the influence of quantitative,
development economics, these histories have moved away from a consideration of new
technology and industry to the macroeconomy of growth, where disaggregation
proceeds no further than carving the economy into big sectors like agriculture or
industry^ For her, processes of production lie at the heart of the revolution and should
be the focus of concern. Yet she also rejects Landes' famous study of technical change
because 'His Industrial Revolution was apocalyptic; his vision of its processes
cataclysmic' - she accepts Crafts's broad characterization of economic development.56
Her book looks at industry and technology within the context of slow growth, and where
continuity of modes of production was as important as change. Her main concern is
to contest solely economic explanations of economic history. She argues that
Profitability and labour costs were important determinants for the development of each
[industrial] structure, but ...in a transitional capitalist society they were not the only ones
custom, community and patriarchal discipline played at least as significant a role in artisan,
cooperative and protofactory alternatives to putting-out. This range of industrial structures also
implied a range of different types of labour discipline and technological change."
This, if you like, is an economic history from below, where techniques of production
are seen in the context of the men, women and children who" use3 them and where
artisans and outworkers rather than factory operatives are the focus of concern." It is
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54
 M. Berg, The machinery question and the making of political economy 1815-1848 (Cambridge,
1980).
66
 Berg, p. 16. D. S. Landes, The unbound Prometheus (Cambridge, 1969).
" Berg, p. 90.
222 HISTORICAL JOURNAL
a history ofdomestic outworkjind worksjb.c-ps rather than factories, of Birmingham toys
and Sheffield cutlery rather than Lancashire cotton. It is a "history STways of life and
work as much as efficiency and marginality. These are good, striking aims and represent
an important attempt to reverse the hardening of the arteries that the economic history
of the Industrial Revolution has suffered. But Berg's book is much better as a series
of hypotheses than as a set of selective conclusions. Her targets are well chosen, but
her shooting is a little wayward.
One problem with The age of manufactures is that it reads as a series of imperfectly
connected essays. This may make it more useful as a textbook, but given the strength
and relative novelty of her arguments it detracts somewhat from the book's purpose.
Equally, some parts of the book subtract from rather than add to its aim. Her discussion
of the perceptions of manufacturing by contemporary economists, which purports to
show how well aware they were of the reality of economic life, is based on an unspecified
selection of authors that ignores the jeremiads - the doubters and worriers who
periodically complained that the economy was on the point of collapse. Secondly, Berg
calls on Marx's model of primitive accumulation and the model of proto-
industrialization to show that ' the period just before industrialization was characterized
by a multiplicity of different organizational structures of manufacture. The resilience
of these structures was determined by their own special adaptability to the market, but
it was also significantly affected by a range of nonmarket values and institutions'.57 Yet
there are simpler, narrative means of arriving at such a position than by calling on the
models of Marx and Mendels. The urge to unite theory and history sometimes gets the
better of her in a fashion similar to new economic history.
Description and analytical categories do not always co-operate harmoniously or
constructively in Berg's book. This is clearest in her attempts to pull economic and social
history together. Few could challenge the importance and justness of this effort, but
the chapter in which she attempts this in a concerted way (chapter 7, 'Custom and
community in domestic manufacture and trades') is not successful. That chapter
revolves around descriptions of solidarity among groups of workers, often in a local
context, and of consumption as a 'form of social participation' able to 'convey the fine
gradations of social class, age and hierarchy'.58 But her descriptions of both community
solidarity and consumption are imprecise. Her examples of collective action tend to
show people behaving not so much in defence of a type of social life as in pursuit of
wages, conditions of work and job security. Naturally, the sanction of the community
or kinship networks mattered in that struggle, but a more important question is whether
ways of life took precedence at any time over ways of work.59 The way of life helped .
structure the nature of industrial workers' reactions to changes in methods of pro-
duction, but it was not the only determinant of the strength of that action and did
not alone determine when and where such action would be necessary. Attempts to
enclose the commons could threaten both a way of life and work, as the Hammonds
and Thompson showed." Social life was important in structuring reactions to forces
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making for economic change and were perhaps strong enough at times to prevent or
restrict such changes. But Berg needs to adopt a more varied picture of social action.
She tends to adopt a position of social determinism just as other historians are often
economic determinists. The reality of the past almost certainly involves an elaborate
web of social, economic, political and intellectual determinism. The shift from
communal to individual economic life that we often assume accompanied the triumph
of capitlTTsnTwaseShiprex and variegated. Berg is right to stress that 'the imperatives
of the world of community cannot really be so separated off from the world of work',
but is imprecise in detailing the importance of community in eighteenth-century
economic history.
One particular strength of Berg's book is that she assaults the whig approach to the
eighteenth-century economy by including a chapter on industrial decline. As she puts
it, ' Industrial decline is a subject curiously neglected by economic historians who are
generally more concerned to point out the triumphs of industrialization and the growth
of new regions'.61 Perhaps, though, stagnant areas of the economy might also have been
discussed - this would have allowed more' shades of grey' than a simple growth/decline
distinction. Many areas of the eighteenth-century economy trod water, roughly
maintaining their position. London's economy, for example, though by-passed by the
factories, nevertheless managed to remain pivotal to the economy as a whole and kept
its share of national population. Berg follows most historians of the Industrial
Revolution in ignoring the capital.
The questions Berg raises are better phrased than her answers. Those unhappy
students struggling to understand the Industrial Revolution will probably find Crafts's
book better medicine. Indeed, Berg's book operates within the broad ouline provided
by Crafts and attempts to isolate some of the factors that influenced dynamism, inertia
and collapse. In that sense the two books are complementary, not competing
interpretations. But Berg broadens the teleology in ways that Crafts does not by
attempting a reconciliation of economic history with other disciplines. In that way her
book is more novel and exciting than Crafts's. But, as she admits,' There are many other
gaps both in the general discussion and in the detailed history of the book'.*2 In fact,
we still know too little to be able to write convincingly the type of book Berg has
attempted. Perhaps her effort will, as she hopes, spur others on.
Crafts has taken historians closer to being able to unpick the Gordian knot of the
Industrial Revolution simply by describing more accurately its outer form. But its inner
complexities still remain largely hidden. If the outer part of the knot has been untied,
its heart remains intact and can only be tackled with new pieces of information and
different perspectives. In the first place, a_niultidiniensional chronology has to be
applied to the IndustriaJ^R^SXaJiyjon, one where the classic period nestles with earlier
and later pieces of trg^siti.o.n. Both Crafts and Berg make some moves Th'liKis'tfifrfection;-'
but there is still a long way to go. Equally, respect will have to be paid to both change
and continuity. Beyond that, the nature of markets needs detailing - how they workecl
and whether they changed. This will relate not only to economic, institutional or
political factors but exactly to the communal and cultural factors Berg is concerned
of anonymity', in H. Day, P. Linebaugh and E. P. Thompson (eds.), Album's fatal tree (Harmonds-
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with. Distribution and exchange will have to be subjected to much more attention. To
do this will almost certainly involve crossing and re-crossing the border between
quantitative and qualitative evidence and method; old and new economic history have
to get on better with one another. As a corollary to this need to study markets, historians
will have to pay attention to the actual nature of decision making. In the drive for
generalizations and analytical clarity, the economic history of the Industrial Revolution
has often forgotten that an economy functions as the sum of individual decisions. The
short term has been sacrificed to the idol of medium and long term. Generalizations
have been produced not by accumulating particularities but by using a wide-angled
lens. The nature of opportunities, risks and rewards faced by decision makers has been
pursued at too general a level and in too whiggish a way. Micro, short-term studies
will help put macro, long-term views into perspective. We have to understand much
more clearly how farmers, businessmen and labourers saw opportunities and problems,
how accurate those perceptions were and how they responded to them. And again, in
places this can be a quantitative assessment but in others it cannot. The quantitative
and qualitative approaches, in this period of economic history at least, are not
competing methods but, because of the nature of evidence and the range of questions
that need answering, mutually reinforcing ones. If the history of the Industrial
Revolution can be statistical and literary, macro and micro, short, medium and long
term, personal and impersonal, economic, social, political and intellectual, and can
encounter a genuinely wide range of theory, then perhaps students will find it an
exciting and exacting problem not an infuriating one.
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